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On the Very Problem of the Problem of God 
in Zubiri and Unamuno* 
 
Brad Elliott Stone 
Loyola Marymount University 
Los Angeles, California, USA 
Abstract 
Perhaps one innovation brought about by Spanish philosophy is the notion that “God” 
names a problem instead of an entity.  This is what Xavier Zubiri means when he uses the 
phrase “the problem of God.”  Although he does not employ the Zubirian phrase, Miguel de 
Unamuno also addresses God as a problem.  This paper compares Zubiri’s and Unamuno’s 
accounts of how God appears to human beings polemically.  For both thinkers, God is a 
problem only for human beings; there is something about the structure of human existence 
that makes God come to mind.  For Zubiri, God comes to mind because human beings find 
themselves implanted into reality.  For Unamuno, God comes to mind because human be-
ings understand their own mortality and seek to overcome it.  After presenting their respec-
tive views on the structures of human beings that account for the problem of God, the phi-
losophical implications of such a view are explored.  If we take Zubiri and Unamuno to be 
correct about “the very problem of the problem of God,” true theism would not be eviden-
tialist (this is the way “theism” works in traditional philosophy of religion).  Also, true athe-
ism (the claim that God does not exist) would be impossible, for even if the entity called 
“God” does not in fact exist, “God” as a problem (the problem of God) does. 
Resumen 
Quizás una innovación provocada por filosofía española es la noción de que “Dios” re-
fiere a un problema en vez de una entidad.  Esto es lo que Xavier Zubiri quiere decir al usar 
la frase “el problema de Dios”.  Aunque él no emplea la frase zubiriana, Miguel de Unamu-
no también se dirige a Dios como un problema.  Este ensayo compara el pensamiento de 
Zubiri y de Unamuno en torno a cómo Dios aparece polémicamente a los seres humanos.  
Para ambos pensadores, Dios es sólo un problema para los seres humanos; hay algo sobre 
la estructura de existencia humana que hace que Dios venga a la mente.  Para Zubiri, Dios 
viene a la mente porque los seres humanos se encuentran implantado en realidad.  Para 
Unamuno, Dios viene a la mente porque los seres humanos entienden su propia mortalidad 
y buscan superarlo.  Después de presentar sus vistas respectivas de las estructuras huma-
nas que explican el problema de Dios, se exploran las implicaciones filosóficas de tales vis-
tas.  Si supongamos que Zubiri y Unamuno sean correctos sobre “el problema mismo del 
problema de Dios,” el verdadero teísmo no sería evidentialista (ésta es la manera en que el 
“teísmo” funciona en la filosofía tradicional de la religión). También, el verdadero ateísmo (la 
demanda de que Dios no existe) sería imposible, ya que aun cuando la entidad llamó que 
“Dios” no exista de hecho, “Dios” como un problema (el problema de Dios) sí existe. 
                                              
* In honor of Charles C. Seabrook, who introduced me to the wonderful philosophical tradition of 
Spain through an advanced Spanish grammar lesson 
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La oración del ateo 
 
Oye mi ruego Tú, Dios que no existes, 
y en tu nada recoje estas mis quejas, 
Tú que a los pobres hombres nunca dejas 
sin consuelo de engaño.  No resistes 
 
a nuestro ruego y nuestro anhelo vistes. 
Cuando Tú de mi mente más te alejas, 
más recuerdo las plácidas consejas, 
con que mi ama endulzóme noches tristes. 
 
¡Qué grande eres, mi Dios!  Eres tan grande 
que no eres sino Idea; es muy angosta 
la realidad por mucho que se espande 
 
para acabarte.  Sufro yo a tu costa, 
Dios no existente, pues si Tú existieras 
existiría yo también de veras. 
The Atheist’s Prayer 
 
Hear my prayer you nonexisting God, 
and in your nothingness take up my laments, 
you who never leaves poor men 
without deceptive consolation.  You do not resist 
 
our prayers and  you disguise our desires. 
The more you move yourself away from my mind, 
the more I remember the placid fables 
used by my mom to comfort me on sad nights. 
 
How great you are, my God!  You are so great 
that you are nothing but an idea; reality is steadfast, 
no matter how much one tries to force 
 
you to come to an end.  I suffer at your expense, 
nonexisting God, for if you were to exist 
then I would truly also exist.1 
 
Introduction 
For Spanish existentialists, “God” is 
the name of a problem, not an entity (the-
ology deals with the entity).  In other 
words, the problem is not what God is, or 
what the problem of God is; rather, it is 
that God is a problem (for theists and 
atheists alike).  Why do we even talk about 
God?  This is what I refer to as “the very 
problem of the problem of God.”  The very 
problem of the problem of God is directly 
tied to another great problem, the problem 
of being human.  “Being human” is the 
name of the problem in which we find our-
selves.  I maintain that “the problem of 
being human” is equivalent to “the very 
problem of the problem of God;” that is, it 
is insofar as we are human beings that 
“God” is a problem.  I shall not explore 
“the very problem of the problem of being 
human” here since this essay is on God, 
but it might be easiest to explain it by re-
ferring to Heidegger’s Being and Time as a 
good treatise on the issue. 
Ever since Seneca and St. Isidore of 
Seville, the question of what it means to be 
a human being (in a sense different than 
“rational animal”) has been posed most 
intensely, and most intimately, by thinkers 
from the Iberian Peninsula.  For the Span-
ish philosopher, the problem of being hu-
man and the problem of God are insepa-
rable.  Failure to take up one of the prob-
lems results in the incapacity to take up 
the other.  “God” is meaningless without 
human beings, and “human beings” are 
only such in light of God.  Within the 
Spanish tradition, it seems that atheism is 
a kind of misanthropy, and a hatred of life 
is blasphemous. 
Two 20th century Spanish existential-
ists offer the most congruency between the 
problem of God and the problem of being 
human.  The philosopher who emphasizes 
this dual problematic most systematically 
is Xavier Zubiri, whose conception of “reli-
gation” explains the existential constitu-
tion of human life, the divine nature of 
God, and the origin of religions.  Miguel de 
Unamuno, although not as systematic as 
Zubiri, yet definitely more passionate, 
views God and human life as mutual crea-
tive processes.  In his account, humans 
make God and God makes them; creation 
is a mutual process. 
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The similarities between these two 
thinkers go beyond the fact that they are 
both of Basque descent.  Neither accepts 
the traditional proofs for the existence of 
God as useful for truly understanding the 
problem of God.  As a consequence of the 
failures of these proofs, mere rejection of 
them does not constitute atheism.  Both 
hold that the human condition is a consti-
tutive part of the idea of God.  Neither be-
lieves that true atheism is possible, for 
being human automatically makes one 
have the problem of God, so atheists and 
theists both face the problem of God.   
In this essay, I present Zubiri and 
Unamuno’s respective views on the unity 
of being human and God as well as the 
refutation of theism and atheism, tradi-
tionally conceived, that results from those 
views.  By doing so, I will offer a different, 
more Spanish way of thinking about hu-
mans, God, and the relationship between 
the two.  To these ends, this essay is com-
posed of four sections. 
In the first section, I explicate Zubiri’s 
jointure of the problem of being human 
(religation) to the problem of God (deity).  
Section two discusses Unamuno’s union of 
the tragic sense of life (the problem of be-
ing human) and God (the problem of God).  
The point of these first two sections is to 
show that, for both thinkers, the problem 
of God is the direct consequence of the 
problem of being human.  Only human 
beings are religious; “God” names an im-
portant fact about being human. 
Sections three and four explore the 
consequences of understanding God in 
Spanish existentialist terms.  These con-
sequences challenge traditional philosophy 
of religion and call it back to its proper 
grounding.  The third section deals with 
the critique of theistic evidentialism that 
comes along with understanding the prob-
lem of God in terms of the problem of be-
ing human.  For the theistic evidentialist, 
God’s existence is provable by demonstra-
tion.  There have been many different 
demonstrations produced in the history of 
philosophy; the three main ones are the 
ontological, cosmological, and teleological 
proofs for the existence of God.  However, 
given that God is connected to the problem 
of being human, these proofs miss the 
mark and prove something different from 
the God expressed in this essay.  There-
fore, I will argue that theistic evidentialist 
arguments are insufficient for, if not det-
rimental to, true belief in God.  Zubiri ar-
gues that such proofs only prove divinity 
and therefore fail to prove God.  Unamuno 
worries that theistic proofs actually prove 
the wrong God, who Unamuno calls the 
“God-Idea,” who is in reality no God at all. 
The second consequence for the phi-
losophy of religion is that arguments 
against the existence of God are equally 
insufficient.  First of all, given that theistic 
arguments are insufficient, merely point-
ing out that insufficiency cannot be athe-
ism.  Second, and this is the bigger thrust 
of the section, atheism is itself a position 
inside of the problem of God.  Atheists fail 
to see that the nonexistence of God only 
matters to the atheist insofar as the athe-
ist is already religated to God through the 
problem of being human.  In other words, 
atheism is one of the solutions to the 
problem of God.  This, of course, does not 
remove the problem called “God.”  Zubiri 
argues that atheism is solipsistic self-
divinization, and is therefore unsustain-
able.  Unamuno sees the atheist as a des-
perate person frustrated by the difficulties 
of proving God’s existence.  However, once 
evidentialism is defeated, atheists will not 
have to despair about not finding proof, 
and true atheism is defeated. 
I. Zubiri: Religation, Deity, Divinity, 
God 
For Zubiri, being human means to 
find oneself implanted in existence.  This 
implantation is understood in terms of 
what Zubiri calls “religation.”  The problem 
of being human is for Zubiri the problem 
of being religated.  Since religation is an 
imposition, one must inquire into the im-
poser.  This is the very problem of the pro-
76 Brad Elliott Stone 
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blem of God.  Zubiri explores the problem 
of God in terms of “deity” (the power of 
reality, which imposes itself onto us), “di-
vinity” (the foundation of deity), and “God” 
(the absolutely absolute personal reality 
who gives reality its impressive force 
through love.).  In this section, I will ex-
plain Zubiri’s conception of religation, de-
ity, divinity, and God. 
Humans, like other animals, are sen-
tient creatures.  Everything we encounter 
is encountered through our senses.  Sens-
ing is composed of three moments accord-
ing to Zubiri:  affection, the moment of 
otherness, and the force of imposition.  
Affection is the aspect of sensation in 
which “the sentient being ‘suffers’ the im-
pression.”2  This element is uncontrover-
sial, and most traditional philosophy 
starts (and unfortunately ends) here. 
The moment of otherness is the aspect 
of sensation in which impression “is the 
presentation of something other in affec-
tion.”3  Zubiri calls the other which pre-
sents itself in affection a note.  Notes are 
not qualities, but things that are “noted” 
(noticed) in experience.  For example, for 
animals that only see in black and white, 
“red” is not “noted” and therefore is not 
part of the sensation of an object (even if 
the object is “red” to those animals who 
“notice” color). 
The force of imposition is the aspect of 
sensation in which “the note present in 
the affection imposes itself upon the sen-
tient being” and “arouses the process of 
sensing.”4  We do not get to pick what is 
noticed; something is either a note or it is 
not.  If something is a note, it imposed 
itself in sensation.  By virtue of this impo-
sition, the note is “noted.”  Affection, the 
moment of otherness, and the force of im-
position, although they are three different 
aspects of sensation, are unified in a sin-
gular event of sensing. 
So far, Zubiri’s account of sensation 
(which Zubiri calls “sensible apprehen-
sion”) shows no differentiation between 
humans and other animals.  The differ-
ence, Zubiri writes, has to do with a differ-
entiation in the modes of sensible appre-
hension.  For animals, sensation merely 
serves as the experience of stimuli.  The 
stimulus affects the animal; the animal 
responds accordingly.  The example Zubiri 
gives is how animals respond to heat.  
Animals receive the stimulus “is warming” 
as a note imposed upon them as other.  If 
the animal is seeking heat, it welcomes 
this “is warming” and draws towards the 
heat source; if the animal is too hot, it 
flees from the “is warming.”  In very simple 
creatures, response to stimuli is instanta-
neous; in more complex animals (including 
humans when interpreted biologically), 
there is the power of “hesitation” (to use 
Bergson’s phrasing) that increases the 
more complex the creature.  For example, 
even though I am hot in a sauna, I do not 
run away from it; I can hesitate. 
Human beings, although they do re-
ceive and respond to stimuli, do something 
more in the moment of sensing.  Zubiri 
argues that humans sense reality along 
with the stimuli.  To return to the note of 
heat, of course humans experience the “is 
warming,” but they also experience “heat,” 
which is more than “is warming.”  Rather, 
it is heat de suyo (in its own right).  This 
“in its own right” is the reality of a given 
note.  Humans can separate the heat from 
the source and let the heat be de suyo; it 
is because of this humans are capable of 
studying thermodynamics, for example.5 
Therefore, humans have the affection 
of reality.  The moment of otherness is the 
de suyo of a note.  The note has an “in its 
own right” that makes it other than me.  
Animals, although they do experience the 
“other than me” of certain stimuli, fail to 
understand the “in its own right” of the 
stimuli.  For humans, on the other hand, a 
note is “in and for itself … heat is a way 
included in the sentient process, but only 
because it already is heat.  Heat as some-
thing de suyo is … prior to its being pre-
sent in sensing.”6  In terms of the force of 
imposition, “what is apprehended is im-
posed upon me with … the force of real-
ity.”7  Reality forces itself upon me in the 
sensation of notes that are “in their own 
right” my apprehension of things. 
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Human beings, unlike animals, ap-
prehend reality, the de suyo of notes that 
impose themselves on humans as some-
thing other.  We are “implanted in real-
ity.”8  This implantation is what Zubiri 
calls “religation.”  Religation is the “seizure 
by the power of the real.”9  “The real” 
which has power over human beings is not 
a quality or property of the things humans 
experience; it, too, is de suyo.  “The real” is 
enigmatic (Levinasian enough yet?); we 
experience that things are real, but reality 
de suyo of those things eludes us (except 
in certain cases related to our own reality 
as persons).  The problem of being human, 
the very problem of the problem of God, 
lies in this seizure by the power of reality 
de suyo.  The problem of our humanity is 
that “we are founded in an enigma, the 
enigma of the power of the real.”10  This 
enigma makes our life a mystery, leaving 
us to ask existential questions—e.g., 
“What is going to become of me?” and 
“What am I going to make of myself?”11  
Reality de suyo is an enigma that makes 
us who we are and grounds everything we 
experience.  Therefore, everything is reli-
gated by the power of the real; the catch is 
that only humans experience that fact. 
The problem of reality is “formally the 
problem of God.  What religation manifests 
experientially and enigmatically is God as 
a problem.  The problem of God belongs … 
to the constitution of my own person.”12  
The problem of being human is the prob-
lem that brings us to the problem of God.  
Zubiri explores the problem of God in 
terms of a successive trio: deity, divinity, 
God. 
Deity is the name Zubiri gives to “this 
ultimate, possibilitating, impelling power 
[of reality].”13  In other words, “deity” is the 
name of the enigmatic power of the real.  It 
is found in humans not as something ex-
tra to experience (that is religation), but as 
the foundation of all experiences.  As 
Zubiri writes, “[m]an does not have experi-
ence of deity, but rather is the very experi-
ence of deity in his own substantive being 
… The personal act of religation is pure 
and simply the experience of deity.”14  In 
other words, “religation,” the problem of 
being human, is the same as “deity,” the 
very problem of the problem of God.  The 
problem of God is simply the exploration of 
the question “what constitutes this deity 
in which humans find themselves?”  No-
tice that this means that “deity” is not 
equivalent to “God.”  All that has been 
shown so far is that the problem of being 
human (the problem of being implanted in 
reality) and the very problem of the prob-
lem of God (the problem of reality de suyo) 
are linked together, therefore establishing 
for Zubiri the congruence of being human 
and God. 
From deity, one can move to “divinity.”  
Divinity is “that fundament*, which un-
doubtedly belongs to reality without being 
deity, but is precisely the fundament of the 
deity of things.”15  This is demonstrable, as 
is done in arguments for God’s existence.  
All these proofs do is show that reality is 
really real, distinct from “subjective” ex-
periences of it; nothing more, nothing less.  
Zubiri is quick to remind us that divinity 
“is not sufficient for reaching God, because 
a very important question remains unan-
swered.  Is the first cause that which men 
call “God”, that to which man directs him-
self not only with demonstration, but will 
all his acts of submission, prayer, etc.? … 
who is the first cause?”16  As I will explain 
in section three, Aquinas’s jump to God 
from “unmoved mover,” “first cause,” etc. 
is too big of a leap to make.  Although 
Aquinas is right—God will be those 
things—he seems to equate the terms  
“divinity” and “God.”  This is an error.  
After all, the unmoved mover can be “me” 
if I am a solipsist.  We have to see the 
“who” of divinity as something de suyo. 
 God is beyond divinity, and cannot 
be demonstrated.  Zubiri writes that God 
is “absolutely absolute reality … it de-
pends on nothing, not even that on which 
                                              
* The word “fundament” is sometimes used in 
place of “ground” to translate the Spanish 
fundamento. 
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every human person depends, to wit, his 
nature … but is rather a free act.  The first 
cause as a personal and free reality: here 
we at last have God.”17  This can only be 
affirmed by faith, which Zubiri describes 
in terms of donation—love.  God is the 
giver of reality, and humans are the recipi-
ents of that reality.  We have faith in God 
when we believe that the reality in which 
we find ourselves implanted is a gift and 
not a curse, an obligation and not a causal 
determinism; faith in God means seeing 
human beings as a finite moment of God, 
a participant in reality.18  To believe in God 
is to acknowledge the reality we find our-
selves in and to embrace our religation.  
This is why for Zubiri God is an experience 
of being human, and being human is an 
experience of God.19  
II. Unamuno: The Tragic Sense of God 
Like Zubiri, Unamuno sees the prob-
lem of being human as a prerequisite to 
approaching the problem of God.  Al-
though not as systematic as Zubiri, Una-
muno is definitely more passionate about 
the relationship between human beings 
and God.  Unamuno’s main philosophical 
opus, Tragic Sense of Life, outlines the 
relationship between human beings and 
God.  Unamuno starts by explaining the 
tragic sense of life as the problem of being 
human.  Human beings, who for Una-
muno are concrete people “of flesh and 
bone,” seek immortality against the 
awareness of their deaths.  This fight for 
immortality opens up the problem of God, 
and God is described as a concrete, sen-
tient volition for the eternity of human 
existence. 
For Unamuno, human beings are de-
fined tragically and concretely.  To show 
that Unamuno is concerned with human 
beings in a non-abstract way, Unamuno 
uses the term “the man of flesh and bone” 
to describe a human life.  The man of flesh 
and bone is described as one who “is born, 
suffers, and dies—above all, who dies.”20  
The important fact about being human is 
that humans are mortal; we die, and we 
are aware of that fact—this is what makes 
us human in comparison to other animals.  
Yes, animals die, but it is not a fact of 
their existence.  Therefore, like Zubiri, 
Unamuno focuses on a formal, modal dis-
tinction here.  Like animals, humans die; 
unlike animals, we devote our life to think-
ing about, worrying over, and overcoming 
death. 
The essence of being human, however, 
is not in the fact that we die.  Instead, the 
essence of being human is the desire to 
never die.  Using Spinoza’s definition of res 
from Ethics, Bk. III, Unamuno writes that 
“[e]verything, in so far as it is in itself, en-
deavors to persist in its own being … This 
means that your essence, reader, mine, … 
and of every man who is a man, is nothing 
but the endeavor, the effort, which he 
makes to continue to be a man, not to 
die.”21  The essence of being human is the 
struggle to forever continue existing.  
Unamuno describes two aspects of being a 
human being, two aspects which must 
remain in order to have the immortality he 
desires: unity and continuity. 
By unity, Unamuno is thinking of the 
body and its spatiality.  We are always 
“focused” on something and direct our 
action toward things.  Unamuno writes 
that “a man is so much the more a man 
the more unitary his action.  There are 
some who throughout their whole life fol-
low but one single purpose, be it what it 
may.”22  Therefore, human beings not only 
desire mere immortality (e.g., the immor-
tality of the soul), but actual corporeal 
perpetuity.  What worries us about death 
is the dread of “having to tear myself away 
from my flesh … from everything sensible 
and material.”23  We are of flesh and bo-
ne—remove the flesh and the bones, and 
we are not. 
By continuity, Unamuno is thinking of 
the Bergsonian notion of memory.24  Una-
muno writes that “memory is the basis of 
the individual personality … We live in 
memory and by memory, and our spiritual 
life is at bottom simply an effort of our 
memory to persist.”25  We are memory.  
The meaning of eternal life is to always be 
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remembered, and to always be remember-
ing. 
At death, it is assumed that one loses 
both unity and continuity.  For the man of 
flesh and bone, this idea is revolting.  As 
Unamuno writes, “[i]f consciousness is … 
nothing more than a flash of light between 
two eternities of darkness, then there is 
nothing more execrable than existence.”26  
In other words, life is pointless and with-
out worth if it is indeed mortal.  Life is 
indeed mortal; therefore, by modus po-
nens, life is worthlessly pointless. 
The essence of being human, Una-
muno argues, is to deny the conclusion of 
this argument, even though it is both valid 
and sound.  In short, the essence of being 
human is a contradiction between the 
head and the heart, between reason and 
volition, which “express[es] a longing for 
unending life, [yet] now affirm[s] that this 
earthly life does not possess the value that 
is given to it.”27  This is the tragic sense of 
life, the absurd battle for immortality. 
The very problem of the problem of 
God is the tragic sense of life.  Unamuno 
notes that all civilizations have the hunger 
for immortality in one form or another.  In 
short, as Unamuno exclaims, “I do not 
want to die—no; I neither want to die nor 
do I want to want to die; I want to live for-
ever and ever and ever.”28  Everything hu-
man beings do, including philosophy and 
religion, screams this mantra over and 
over.  Unamuno uses the example of the 
artist to prove his point here: “a man who 
tells you that he writes, paints, sculpts, or 
sings for his own amusement … lies … He 
wishes … to leave behind a shadow of his 
spirit.”29  We seek eternity, and this eter-
nity must preserve the unity and continu-
ity of our being.  Unamuno writes that “[i]f 
at the death of my body … my conscious-
ness returns to the absolute unconscious-
ness from which it sprang … our toil-worn 
human race … [is] the most inhuman 
thing known.”30 
Being human is the very problem of 
the problem of God.  Animals do not have 
the problem of God, presumably, because 
they lack the tragic sense of life and the 
hunger for immortality.  God’s existence 
matters to human beings because human 
beings are aware of their being, and there-
fore seek its unity and continuity forever.  
Unamuno offers the following anecdote to 
show how tied together the hunger for 
immortality and the problem of God are: 
Talking to a peasant one day, I propo-
sed to him the hypothesis that there 
might indeed be a God who governs 
heaven and earth, a Consciousness of 
the Universe, but that for all that the 
soul of every man may not be immor-
tal in the traditional and concrete 
sense.  He replies: “Then wherefore 
God?”31 
 
What is the point of God if there is no 
hope for immortality?  For Unamuno, 
“God” is the name of that hope, that hu-
manly concrete hope, of being oneself 
eternally.  God is born from the projection 
of human hope into the universe.  Una-
muno reminds us that “[t]he divine … was 
not originally something projective, but 
was rather the subjectivity of conscious-
ness projected exteriorly, the personaliza-
tion of the world.”32  Belief in God is the 
hope of immortality, in whatever form it is 
conceived throughout history.  We want to 
be “God”—to be immortal.  “God” is the 
name of our hatred of nothingness and the 
power of life over nihilism.  Through God, 
human beings are created immortally, so 
that “if you believe in God, God believes in 
you, and believing in you He creates you 
continually.”33  One’s unity is preserved in 
the constant sustaining, and one is re-
membered and remembering in God. 
 Like Zubiri’s move from divinity to 
God, Unamuno argues that faith is the 
only way to access God.  Like with Zubiri, 
faith involves a personal relationship.  
Faith, Unamuno writes, “is not the mere 
adherence of the intellect to an abstract 
principle;” instead, it is a creation of God, 
who in turn creates us, and is therefore 
“continually creating Himself in us.”34  
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Said differently, “God and man, in effect, 
mutually create one another; God creates 
or reveals Himself in man and man creates 
himself in God.  God is His own maker.”35  
And therefore we are in God, not with God.  
God is the highest expression of being 
human: immortal and concrete. 
Unamuno’s account of God on the one 
hand seems to lack the philosophical, sys-
tematic structure found in Zubiri’s ac-
count of religation, but, on the other hand, 
better sets the stage for why the very prob-
lem of the problem of God is so important 
and yet so neglected in traditional phi-
losophy of religion.  Whereas Zubiri shows 
us how human beings move from religa-
tion/deity to divinity and ultimately to 
God, Unamuno shows us why human 
beings pursue God.  How and why are 
that questions still unasked by philosophy 
of religion, which is still too focused on 
what questions. 
III. Against Theistic Evidentialism 
Having explicated Zubiri and Una-
muno’s respective existentialist accounts 
of God, I now address two consequences of 
their positions.  The first consequence, 
which will be discussed in this section, is 
that the theistic evidentialist proofs for 
God’s existence, insofar as they fail to ac-
count for the very problem of the problem 
of God, fail to prove God’s existence.  The 
second consequence, explored in section 
four, is that true atheism is impossible.  
Both of these consequences come from the 
same root issue: both theism and atheism 
fail to acknowledge the very problem of the 
problem of God; in other words, theism 
and atheism are both inside of the prob-
lem of God. 
In this section I start with Unamuno’s 
argument against what he calls “the God-
Idea.”  For Unamuno, traditional philoso-
phy of religion, insofar as it refuses to ac-
knowledge the tragic sense of life and the 
concrete man of flesh and bone, misses 
God entirely and replaces God with “God,” 
an empty metaphysical concept.  I con-
clude by describing Zubiri’s criticism of 
the traditional proofs of God’s existence.  
For Zubiri, traditional philosophy of relig-
ion is untrue to the sensible apprehension 
of reality that is given to humans, thus 
replacing reality de suyo (which leads to 
God) with the metaphysical (incorrect) 
notion of reality as being.  It is this reality 
as being that Aquinas inherits from Aris-
totle, which causes his proofs to demon-
strate a God that cannot be worshipped. 
Unamuno 
When it comes to religious matters, 
Unamuno believes that philosophy (tradi-
tionally conceived) is unhelpful and use-
less as a method.  First of all, true phi-
losophy (whose deficient mode is “philoso-
phy” as we have come to know it) is a hu-
man activity that results from the tragic 
sense of life.  To use philosophy to de-
scribe and solve the problem of God would 
be to put the effect before the cause.  Hu-
mans philosophize because we suffer from 
the very problem of the problem of God; 
the problem of God is prior to philosophy.  
Second, as Unamuno writes, “[t]he will 
and the intelligence seek opposite ends.”36  
“Philosophy” excludes the will, and, there-
fore, excludes forthright the very problem 
of the problem of God, which is better un-
derstood in terms of a volition than a 
thought.  “Philosophy” cannot accept its 
origin in the hunger for immortality, the 
selfsame hunger that originally makes God 
come to mind.  Unamuno is very clear 
about the fact that God will have to be a 
granter or guarantor of immortality in or-
der to be significant to human beings. 
The God proven in the philosophy of 
religion is unable to do this.  Unamuno 
writes that the “traditional so-called proofs 
of the existence of God all refer to [the] 
God-idea … and hence they really prove 
nothing.”37  All these proofs do, to use Zu-
biri’s term, is prove that there is a ground 
to reality.  But, for Unamuno, reality 
means nothing if life is pointless.  Whereas 
Zubiri allows room for demonstration and 
reason at the move from deity to divinity, 
Unamuno is more suspicious of our intel-
lectual capacities, preferring sentiment 
On the Very Problem of the Problem of God in Zubiri and Unamuno 81 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2004 
over reason.  In other words, God must 
not only provide for the existence of the 
world, but also give human life purpose (in 
a non-teleological way) through immortal-
ity.  As Unamuno states, “the God who 
confers human meaning and finality upon 
the Universe and who is not the ens sum-
mum, the primum movens, nor the Creator 
of the Universe, nor merely the Idea-God.  
It leads us to the living, subjective God, for 
He is simply subjectivity objectified or per-
sonality universalized.”38  God as the high-
est being, or the first mover—or any of the 
Thomist nomenclatures—cannot confer 
meaning on human life.  The God that 
matters, Unamuno tells us, is the objectiv-
ity of subjectivity, the absolute expression 
of being-a-subject, and the universaliza-
tion of personality, the highest expression 
of being-a-person. 
The reason why such proofs fail, 
Unamuno writes, is that philosophy pre-
tends to be free of personality and subjec-
tivity.  As a result, the philosophical un-
derstanding of what it means to be a hu-
man being is wrong, and, a fortiori, the 
philosophical understanding of God.  The 
philosophical understanding of being hu-
man is simply non-human.  As Unamuno 
writes, 
[T]here is another thing [other than 
“the man of flesh and bone”] which is 
also called man, and he is the subject 
of not a few lucubrations, more or less 
scientific.  He is the legendary feather-
less biped, the zōon politikon of Aris-
totle, the social contractor of Rous-
seau, the homo economicus of the 
Manchester school, the homo sapiens 
of Linnaeus, or, if you like, the vertical 
mammal.  A man neither of here nor 
there, neither of this age or another, 
who has neither sex nor country, who 
is, in brief, merely an idea.  That is to 
say, a no-man.39 
Given that this idea of human being is 
a “no-man,” the God of this approach is 
also nothing.  Unamuno writes that the 
philosophical God “is the projection to the 
outward infinite of man as he is by defini-
tion—that is to say, of the abstract man, of 
the man no-man” whereas the God we 
pursue “is the projection to the inward 
infinite of man as he is by life, of the con-
crete man, the man of flesh and bone.”40 
It is important to note that both Gods 
work the same way; God in both cases is 
the infinite projection of the human being 
described in each case.  When being hu-
man is understood abstractly (outwardly), 
God is abstract, dead, and immortal only 
in the way that ideas are; when being hu-
man is understood concretely (inwardly), 
God is alive, concrete, and immortal in the 
fullest sense.  Philosophical theists prove 
the existence of the God of the no-man, 
the abstract “no-God,” who “neither loved 
nor hated, because He neither enjoyed nor 
suffered, an inhuman God … that is, an 
injustice.”41  It is the direct result of con-
ceiving of being human in terms that make 
emotions and concrete situations acciden-
tal instead of essential. 
Therefore, the move to God cannot be 
rational or demonstrative.  Reason, Una-
muno sates, “separates us from [God].  We 
cannot first know Him in order that after-
wards we may love Him; we must begin by 
loving Him … before knowing Him … 
knowledge of God proceeds from the love 
of God … To seek to define Him is to seek 
to confine Him … to kill Him.”42  By start-
ing with knowing, the philosophy of relig-
ion fails to explain both the motive for the 
pursuit of God and why anyone should 
love God, or why God should love us.  Ta-
ke, for example, the proof that God made 
the world because God is an intelligent 
designer.  Unamuno reminds us that “[w]e 
do not understand the existence of the 
world one whit the better by telling our-
selves that God created it.”43  Humans are 
looking for a God that gives purpose to life, 
which helps one understand the world, not 
a mere trivial fact about its creator. 
Zubiri 
Like Unamuno, Zubiri argues that in 
reducing God’s existence to proofs one is 
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losing the importance of God in the first 
place.  In other words, by reducing God to 
one more object of speculative reasoning, 
one loses the fact that one is exploring 
God’s existence in the first place.  Theists 
and atheists alike have to be able to ex-
plain why it is that God is of such a con-
cern to them.  By already making argu-
ments for and against God’s existence, the 
fundamental issue of religiation/deity is 
already overlooked.  The theist position 
means nothing to those who really believe 
in God, nor does it persuade in the slight-
est those who really do not believe in God. 
We can see this in theistic proofs inso-
far as they work only for those who al-
ready expect them to do so.  The example 
Zubiri gives us is the famous passage from 
Summa Theologica in which Aquinas dis-
cusses the proofs of God’s existence.44  
Zubiri states that the point of that ques-
tion is not really to prove God’s existence 
(that part is actually uncontroversial for 
Aquinas and his contemporaries); rather, 
it is to show that the proposition “God 
exists” is not analytic and is therefore in 
need of an a posteriori demonstration.  
This allows Aquinas to prove divinity cor-
rectly given the way humans are religated.  
But, of course, Aquinas gives no argu-
ments for the religation of humans, nor 
does he move from divinity to God.  To 
Aquinas’s credit, the reason he gives no 
proof for the religation of humans was 
because Aquinas and his peers already 
had the notion of divinity; that is, they 
acknowledged that God is a problem.  Zu-
biri claims that “since there was no ques-
tion for the men of his epoch and environs 
that someone was coming, it was natural 
that St. Thomas should pass over this 
point limiting himself to a statement of 
evidence, in order to delve into the ques-
tion of who it is that comes.”45  Of course, 
in all reality, Aquinas never gets to who is 
coming because he never gets past divinity 
unless “…and this is what we call ‘God’” is 
a moment of faith.  But Aquinas is not 
professing faith here; rather, he is claim-
ing to demonstrate God’s existence by 
pointing the reader back to the standard 
definition of God qua entity.  Granted, 
“God” is the correct answer; but Aquinas’s 
demonstration is faulty.  In our age, one 
does not have to make the leap to God to 
answer the question of “who” the prime 
mover, the first cause, etc. is.  We mod-
erns can easily answer “the laws of phys-
ics,” thus not only not moving from divin-
ity to God, but also removing the point of 
divinity in the first place.  The “who” for 
Aquinas can be replaced by a “what.”  
However, if we start with religation/deity, 
such a move to physics is frustrated.  The 
“who” is personal because we are persons; 
our reality is personal, implanted into ex-
istence by reality itself, which is also a 
person.  And, in spite of Aquinas, this is 
what we mean by the word “God.” 
Zubiri writes the following in an at-
tempt to explain where Aquinas erred: 
I am not maintaining that the five ar-
guments are invalid.  Rather, I am 
saying that contrary to what is ex-
pressly affirmed in them, they do not 
start from facts but from something 
quite different, namely, from a metap-
hysical interpretation of sensible real-
ity … the basis of St. Thomas’ discus-
sion is not the facts but the metaphys-
ics of Aristotle, which for St. Thomas 
is reason itself … [But] the metaphys-
ics of Aristotle is neither of common 
sense nor a datum of experience.46 
 
Reason clouds the facts, namely, the 
fact of being human.  God can be under-
stood because there are facts about being 
human which point us straight to the pro-
blem of God.  For Unamuno, it is the tra-
gic sense of life; for Zubiri, it is the sensi-
ble apprehension of reality.  Therefore, the 
point of departure is wrong; Aquinas fails 
to account for the true facts of the matter.  
For example, in the teleological argument, 
Aquinas correctly notes that we sense that 
nature has “design,” but fails to explain 
why humans are the kind of beings that 
seek design (the answer: religation/deity – 
we sense the reality of the world as organ-
ized other, but that is not metaphysics; 
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rather, it is the concrete way humans find 
themselves implanted in existence). 
In terms of religion, it is clear that the 
God that is worshipped, prayed to, etc. 
does not fit the descriptions Aquinas at-
tributes to God.  As Zubiri writes, “the 
theos of Aristotle has no religious signifi-
cance whatever … No one can address a 
prayer to the unmoved mover, at least 
unless you add a few other things.”47  In 
other words, when Aquinas says “and this 
is what we call ‘God,’” there is clearly a 
large gap between the thing Aquinas 
proves (unmoved mover, first cause, etc.) 
and who he worships.  Stated differently, 
“to the God of Aristotle no one can address 
supplications, or ask for help; he moves 
without being moved as the object of love 
and desire.”48  The God that founds reality, 
however, is praiseworthy, because God is 
the experience of being human.  When we 
worship God, we worship the whole of re-
ality, a reality that only we as humans 
(and God) are privy to. 
Unamuno and Zubiri are both correct 
for questioning traditional theism.  By 
failing to account for human religation (the 
tragic sense of life), the God that results is 
incomplete; not only incompletely demon-
strated, but unworthy of worship.  Our 
relationship to God—the only way God 
matters to human beings—requires more 
than this.  A true theism requires an ac-
knowledgment of the tragic sense of life 
(religation) so as to provide the correct 
starting point for our pursuit of God.  In-
sofar as we have the correct starting point, 
we are only then able to have the correct 
end: a God with whom we can enter into 
relationship, worship, and ultimately 
through that worship, reaffirm what it 
means to be human.  To use the phrase 
often cited at Loyola Marymount Univer-
sity, “the Kingdom of God is a human be-
ing fully alive.”  This is not surprising: 
LMU is a Jesuit institution, and the Jesu-
its are a Spanish order. 
IV. The Impossibility of True Atheism 
In the previous section, the insistence 
on rational proofs for God’s existence leads 
to the wrong God—an abstract God that is 
incapable of being worshipped or entered 
into a relationship.  In this section I move 
to the second consequence of Zubiri and 
Unamuno’s existentialist accounts of God.  
I argue that true atheism is impossible 
given the fact that humans are religated in 
the tragic sense of life. 
There are two ways, perhaps, to con-
sider oneself an atheist.  One would be to 
not consider the proofs of God’s existence 
sufficient to warrant theistic belief.  In 
section three we have already shown that 
theistic evidentialist proofs fail, yet Zubiri, 
Unamuno, and I believe that God exists.  
Therefore, rejection of rational proofs for 
God’s existence cannot constitute atheism.  
The second way to be an atheist is to offer 
a rational proof that God does not exist, as 
one finds, for example, in the problem of 
evil.  The problem of evil shows that God 
does not exist by using a reductio ad ab-
surdum argument: 
1. Assume God exists. 
2. God can stop evil if God wants to 
because God is omnipotent. 
3. God wants to stop evil because God 
is benevolent. 
4. Evil remains [unstopped]. 
5. Therefore, God is either unable to 
stop evil or does not want to stop 
evil. 
6. If God is unable to stop evil, then 
God is not omnipotent. 
7. If God does not want to stop evil, 
then God is not benevolent. 
8. Premises 6 and 7 contradict prem-
ises 2 and 3. 
9. Therefore, God does not exist. 
 
The main problem with this objection 
is that it disproves the existence of God 
from God’s own definition, which presup-
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poses that the definition of “God” being 
used is the correct one.  If it is, then the 
ontological argument of St. Anselm would 
prove God’s existence, because the atheist 
knows what “God” means.  Although both 
Zubiri and Unamuno have defenses of 
God’s existence against the problem of 
evil, I will instead focus on the fact that 
atheism is only possible inside of the prob-
lem of God. 
I will start with Zubiri’s claim that 
atheism is only possible within the prob-
lem of God.  Zubiri believes that the athe-
ist is religated by the power of reality (de-
ity), and is capable of understanding real-
ity de suyo (divinity).  So, the question of 
“who” remains, and the atheist does not 
answer the question with “God.”  I will 
then turn to Unamuno, who claims that 
atheists are people who are stuck in the 
evidentialist rut of theistic proofs.  Out of 
the despair of not being able to prove 
God’s existence, or getting the right God in 
those proofs, the atheist simply gives up 
the struggle. 
Zubiri 
Zubiri describes atheism as simply 
being “a negative position before the deity” 
because “[e]ven the intent to deny all real-
ity to that which founds [existence] … is 
metaphysically impossible without the 
realm of deity.”49  In order to claim that 
something has existence or not requires 
that human beings be the kind of beings 
who find themselves in reality; that is, 
religated.  Therefore, any statement about 
“what there is” (or “what there is not”) re-
quires the power of the real—deity.  The 
atheist claim that God does not exist is 
only possible due to deity itself, the power 
of the real that imposes itself upon human 
beings as other through affection.   For 
Zubiri, “[t]o admit the existence of an ul-
timate reality—call it what you will—is not 
a question of option.”50  Human beings are 
implanted in existence and are obligated to 
create themselves.  We did not ask to be 
here.  To use a Heideggerian term out of 
context (and Zubiri objects to this term for 
other reasons), we are thrown into the 
world and face its reality head on.  In ot-
her words, “not having a religion” is a re-
ligion, a way of understanding one’s religa-
tion to deity, and is therefore “a real and 
positive option just as much as being a 
Buddhist or a Catholic or a Muslim can 
be.”51 
Zubiri claims that some call them-
selves “atheists” incorrectly.  Simply say-
ing that God is not the way traditional 
philosophy has described him, after all, is 
not atheism.  Nor is the rejection of the 
Judeo-Christian-Islamic God of Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob.  It just means that one 
is not a part of those religious traditions.  
Since theism for Zubiri is the understand-
ing of religation and deity, atheism has to 
also address these areas. 
Zubiri writes that atheism is best de-
scribed as the rejection of the fact of reli-
gation: 
The possibility of atheism is the pos-
sibility of feeling “unbound.”  And 
what makes this feeling possible is the 
“sufficiency” of the person for making 
himself through the successful out-
come of his efforts at living.  The suc-
cessful outcome of life is the great 
creator of atheism.  The radical confi-
dence, the trusting to one’s own abili-
ties for living, and the “unbinding” 
oneself from everything are one and 
the same thing.52 
Zubiri points to radical self-confidence 
as the essence of atheism.  In other words, 
atheism is the idea that one is not reli-
gated to reality as explained in section 
one; it is to see oneself without obligation 
to reality.  Levinas, perhaps influenced by 
Zubiri, uses the word “atheism,” correctly, 
to refer to the state of pure autonomy, the 
understanding of the self as self-ruling.  
However, it is important to notice that the 
atheist is still nevertheless religated; one 
thing an atheist (or a solipsist, who is 
equally atheistic perhaps) cannot do, even 
if she or he controls everything else in life, 
is pick when to be born.  Atheism is only a 
possibility in light of religated reality.  The 
reality of religation is deity, and atheists 
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experience the deity by being a moment of 
it, just like theists do. 
The difference comes at the move from 
divinity to God.  The atheist, Zubiri says, 
“affirms that he is God, and that he is suf-
ficient unto himself;” however, “this is not 
properly denying God, but rather disput-
ing over who it is that is God.”53  The athe-
ist is the one who proves the prime mover, 
and claims that she or he is it.  Atheism is 
a claim of self-divinity; that the atheist is 
the reality de suyo of all real things.  
Zubiri correctly points out that there is 
still a “God” involved here; it is just that 
the atheist claims the title for her- or him-
self.  A great Levinasian either-or emerges.  
Who is the divinity, the de suyo of the re-
ality of things that I find myself implanted 
in: me or the Other (God)?  Finally, on a 
Heideggerian note, Zubiri suggests that 
atheism is a deficient mode, an inauthen-
tic mode, of the problem of God: “Atheism 
is not … the primary situation of man.  If 
man is constitutively religated, the prob-
lem will not be in discovering God, but in 
the possibility of covering Him.”54  Atheism 
is the ignoring of the obligation to be 
found in religation.  We can now say that 
true theism is the state of being open as 
the site of reality, both de suyo and of 
things (to borrow from Heidegger’s notion 
of “discoveredness”), and atheism is the 
deficient mode of this discoveredness, cov-
ering over the fact of religation.  True athe-
ism is impossible, just as for Heidegger 
there is no pure inauthenticity; the inau-
thentic, even in spite of itself, reveals the 
truth about Dasein.  Likewise, atheism on 
Zubiri’s model reveals the religation of true 
theism, even when it is trying to supercede 
or ignore it. 
Unamuno 
Unamuno believes that human beings 
seek God because they desire immortality.  
All rational attempts to prove God either 
fail or reach the wrong God—the God-Idea, 
a no-God.  Unamuno believes that one can 
rationally prove that there is no immortal-
ity, and that there is no God.  However, 
given Unamuno’s suspicions about ration-
ality and its abstract methods, one can be 
a theist in spite of evidence, be the evi-
dence for or against the existence of God.  
Atheism cannot be merely the adherence 
to the truth of the arguments that there is 
no immortality or that God does not exist.  
No one is truly a theist on these grounds, 
so neither can one be an atheist. 
Being human is more about volition 
than reason for Unamuno.  Therefore, true 
atheism would have to be a particular voli-
tion, a volition to not continue eternally in 
one’s unity or continuity.  Atheists seek 
consolation for the tragic sense of life in 
reason, and reason leads them to confirm 
their fears, that they will die, and that will 
be it.  They then become upset with what 
they see as the “ignorant consolation” had 
by believers in God, and deep down inside 
wish that they, too, could have such con-
solation.  This is what Unamuno calls 
odium anti-theologicum, an anti-theological 
hatred, of human life.  Simply put, for 
Unamuno, atheists are those who hate 
their lives, those who wish they had been 
someone other than who they are, those 
who shake their fists at God for giving 
them such a crappy lot.  Unamuno clings 
to the last one: atheists, according to 
Unamuno, are those who hate God for 
giving them the taste of life only to with-
draw it at death.  As Unamuno writes, 
“[n]ote the greater part of our atheists and 
you will see that they are atheists from a 
kind of rage, rage at not being able to be-
lieve that there is a God.  They are per-
sonal enemies of God … their No-God is an 
Anti-God.”55  God is always personal; those 
who seek God love God—those who do not 
seek hate God. 
But either way one looks at it, theisti-
cally or atheistically, loving or hating, hu-
man beings face the tragic sense of life, 
which sets up the relationship with God of 
one sort or the other.  Unamuno doubts 
that anyone can truly be an atheist; pro-
claimed atheists are those who have sim-
ply been defeated by the tragic sense of 
life.  In other words, atheists are those 
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who see life as a curse instead of a bless-
ing.  Life is tragic, but life is what we have.  
Life is suffering; we suffer, God suffers—
theism is the undying fight to suffer for-
ever, to experience what Unamuno calls, 
citing St. Theresa of Avila, “sweet-tasting 
suffering:” “Suffering is a spiritual thing … 
A man who had never known suffering … 
would scarcely possess consciousness of 
himself.”56 
Unamuno writes that the tragic sense 
of life, the battle between the head and the 
heart, is the fight between atheism and 
theism, reason and life, nothingness and 
God.  True atheism is impossible because 
the battle rages on: 
“The wicked man hath said in his 
heart, There is no God.”  And this is 
truth.  For in his head the righteous 
man may say to himself, God does not 
exist!  But only the wicked can say it 
in his heart.  Not to believe that there 
is a God or to believe that there is not 
a God, is one thing; to resign oneself 
to there not being a God is another 
thing, and it is a terrible and inhuman 
thing; but not to wish that there be a 
God exceeds every other moral mon-
strosity; although, as a matter of fact, 
those who deny God deny Him be-
cause of their despair at not finding 
Him.57 
Even those who do not wish that there 
is a God do so only because they despair 
at the futility of their previous desires.  
However, at an existential level, the hope 
is still there.  After all, atheists do not all 
commit suicide upon being convinced that 
life is pointless. 
However, the best expressions of 
Unamuno’s views about atheism are not 
found in his essays or books.  Unamuno is 
probably most famous in Spanish litera-
ture for his poetry.  “The Atheist’s Prayer,” 
 
found in Unamuno’s Rosario de sonetos 
líricos (Rosary of Lyrical Sonnets), and 
printed at the beginning of this essay, 
shows how important God is, even to an 
atheist (which Unamuno was constantly 
accused of being due to his rejection of 
rational proofs and other tenants of Ca-
tholicism).  Like all sonnets, there is a 
distinct change of tone between the open-
ing octet and the closing sextet.  In the 
octet, Unamuno describes how God is 
nothing but an attempt to console oneself 
from the tragic sense of life.  Stories of 
God are like fables told to children to help 
them fall asleep.  However, it is the sextet 
that reveals the motive behind the athe-
ist’s concern about God, and the true 
prayer begins.  Unamuno’s atheist in the 
sonnet says the magic words, words that 
bind Unamuno with Zubiri: es muy an-
gosta / la realidad por mucho que se es-
pande / para abarcarte.  Reality is stead-
fast, and forces me to deal with God, re-
gardless of the attempts to put God to rest 
once and for all.  I need God’s existence, 
because if God were to exist, then I would 
truly also exist [eternally]. 
Conclusion 
Zubiri and Unamuno offer a unique 
way of rethinking the existence of God in a 
way that moves beyond the traditional 
philosophical methods of proving God’s 
existence and also overcomes the threat of 
atheism.  Being human is the foundation 
of all inquiries into God, and the failure to 
address that foundation leads to a God 
that is never worth proving, or to no God 
at all.  By grounding theism in the existen-
tial foundation of being human, both thin-
kers have navigated a new path towards 
how we know/love/are/live/create God, 
and how in turn God knows/loves/ 
is/lives/creates us. 
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is clear that Unamuno had read Bergson’s 
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